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Abstract 
 
The future of enterprise software development lies 
in the use of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) to 
support business concerns. Business services are using 
security services offered by service-oriented security 
architectures for security support. The question re-
mains how to implement the security services using 
traditional security products and how to map security 
policies defined at service level to product-specific po-
licies. In this paper we present an approach for inte-
grating existing security products into service-oriented 
security architectures. We show how traditional se-
curity products can be adapted to fit into the overall 
service-oriented paradigm. We present a case study 
that applies our approach. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To tackle the increasingly complex requirements of 
IT systems, enterprises are adopting service-oriented 
architecture (SOA) to align their IT with their business 
processes. While Web service technology is commonly 
used to implement core concerns, cross-cutting con-
cerns are hard to integrate into the overall SOA devel-
opment process. Especially security is often an after-
thought, considering the amount of overly complex 
Web service security standards. A service-oriented so-
lution to this problem is to provide security as a serv-
ice, i.e. offering a set of services, offering the central 
functionality of e.g., authentication, authorization and 
policy management. These services are part of a secu-
rity architecture, of which we presented a blueprint of 
in [1]. 
Yet the critical task of the security services requests 
the reuse and therefore integration of existing security 
products into the security architecture. Additionally, 
focusing on access control, the respective policy 
models at service and at product level must be aligned. 
The integration requires two main tasks. At first, the 
components of the security product need to be mapped 
to the logical building blocks of a security architecture. 
Design gaps between the provided service interfaces of 
a security architecture and the proprietary interfaces of 
the security product require adaptation. Secondly, 
access control policies for an SOA are specified in a 
language not supported by the security products and 
therefore need to be mapped to the internal policy 
language of the security product. 
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Figure 1. Service-oriented Architecture 
requiring Security Services 
 
The contributions of this paper are: 
 
1. We present an approach to transparently integrate 
existing security products into a security architecture, 
focusing on the access control service. 
2. We show how access control policies for Web 
services can be mapped in order to be used by the 
integrated security product. 
 
In order to achieve these goals, we built upon our 
previous works concerning service-oriented security 
architectures and access control policy models [1]. We 
demonstrate our approach by integrating the commer-
cial of the shelf (COTS) security product Tivoli Access 
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Manager of IBM into our service-oriented security ar-
chitecture and by mapping our service-oriented access 
control policies onto product-specific policies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents approaches to security architectures focusing 
on access control and access control models. In Sec-
tion 3 we present our approach to the integration of ex-
isting security products into a service-oriented security 
architecture. In Section 4 we show how to derive prod-
uct-specific access control policies from product-inde-
pendent ones. In Section 5 our approach is applied 
practically in a case study. A conclusion and an out-
look on future research in this area close the body of 
this paper. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
2.1 Access Control Architectures 
 
The access control architecture described in [2] uses 
multiple distributed access control processors (ACP) to 
control access to Web services. An ACP itself is a 
Web service which is responsible for access control 
decisions. A special ACP called gatekeeper is used to 
put the access control decision for a Web service into 
action, authenticating users and issuing security to-
kens. It also determines the necessary ACP to compute 
the access control decision for an access request. The 
amount and order of the ACP is an open design deci-
sion. The interceptor pattern [3] is used to implement 
the gatekeeper in order to intercept the SOAP mes-
sages sent to a Web service. The flexibility of the ap-
proach is also its greatest weakness when it comes to 
the implementation of the ACP using existing security 
products. Obviously each ACP could be implemented 
by a security product, but there is no need for all the 
ACP to be Web services themselves. A service should 
offer a coarse-grained interface which reduces the nec-
essary invocations of that service, as these are expen-
sive operations. Calling multiple ACP Web services 
leads to a tremendous performance loss. 
In [4] an approach for a policy based access control 
architecture is proposed using an event-driven para-
digm. The coordination between the security services 
takes place using the exchange of events. This allows 
the distribution of the services without a central con-
trol. The functional services themselves are distributed 
into a digital identity management, an authentication 
management as well as an access control service. Each 
service has a similar structure consisting of a decision 
point which evaluates related policies and an enforce-
ment point which puts the decisions into place. In or-
der for each service to maintain a coherent view of all 
security relevant information and to be able to create a 
shared context, a notification service and a context 
service are introduced into the architecture. Questions 
still remain concerning the interaction between the 
services, the format of the events and the handling of 
event messages. This approach also suffers from the 
overuse of Web service interfaces. Additionally one 
can question the choice of an event-driven approach 
for the communication between the services. Events 
are typically used for asynchronous communication 
between distributed partners in an unreliable network. 
Assuming that one applies the security architecture in 
the controllable and reliable environment of an enter-
prise intranet the use of synchronous communication 
might be more applicable. 
Although each of the security architectures tries to 
solve a certain problem, they are not suited for the task 
of integrating an existing security product efficiently. 
This is due to the lacking differentiation of distin-
guished service interfaces offered to the business serv-
ices of a SOA and the internal component interfaces 
used by the security architecture itself. 
 
2.2 Access Control Models 
 
SecureUML [5] is an access control model based on 
an extended version of role based access control 
(RBAC). In the model, the nature of the protected 
object is undetermined and can be adapted to multiple 
use cases. This is demonstrated by defining policy lan-
guages for process and component systems. Policies 
contain the possible actions a subject can perform on 
an object and are supported by basic attribute based 
authorization constraints. Opposite to the basic RBAC, 
basic actions can be composed. A policy defined for a 
compound action is passed on to its basic actions. Al-
though the approach is flexible enough to be used in 
the context of a service-oriented architecture (SOA), 
the usage in a security architecture and of a specialized 
security product is not the main focus. Instead the se-
curity infrastructure of an underlying development 
platform is utilized. Additionally, the complex context 
of an SOA, e.g., a composition of Web services, can 
not be represented with SecureUML. 
RBAC is also the basis for SECTET-PL [6], a poli-
cy language for business workflows using Web serv-
ices. It is based on the declarative Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) [7] and can therefore be used in the 
context of system models defined using the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) [8]. Policies are specified 
using predicates and are attached to Web services 
defined in an interface view. This view contains de-
scriptions of the partner services interface, service ex-
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change documents as well as roles and permissions. 
The usage of the approach is demonstrated by mapping 
the policies to the policy language eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML, [9]). Most of the 
arguments against SecureUML hold for SECTET-PL 
as well. Another constraining argument is the indispen-
sable focus on OCL and UML to define the policies. 
In summary comparing the approaches to the aim of 
integrating existing security products it can be seen 
that RBAC alone is not flexible enough for specifying 
service level policies [10]. The mapping of service 
level policies to product level policies has so far only 
been shown for ABAC policies [11]. 
 
3. Architectural Integration 
 
Security is not a core concern of a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA). Yet it is an important aspect of 
practical usage. To cover this cross-cutting concern, 
security should be offered as a set of services itself. 
We proposed a well-defined set of security service 
interfaces to be used by Web services and in an SOA 
in [12]. Existing and field-tested security products 
should be used to implement these interfaces. In this 
Section we describe relevant parts of our security ar-
chitecture followed by an overview of the IBM Tivoli 
Access Manager (TAM). Then we show how the com-
ponents of the TAM fit into our architecture. 
 
3.1 Service-oriented Security Architecture 
 
The security architecture we described in [1] and 
[12] consists of three logical layers. The first layer 
contains the well-defined and stable service interfaces 
to be used by other services. The authentication inter-
face provides operations to authenticate a subject and 
to issue a temporary security token to be used for fur-
ther access control. An access control decision can be 
delegated to the authorization verification service in-
terface. Management of users, groups as well as access 
control policies is done through the administration 
service interface. We also presented a set of possible 
components, implementing these interfaces. In a func-
tional layer, a secure token service component per-
forms the authentication of subjects. A policy decision 
point (PDP) component encapsulates access control 
decisions logic. Lastly an administration component 
implements the administration interface. The func-
tional components store and retrieve their data from 
components placed in the data layer below. 
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Figure 2. Blueprint of an SOA-aware Security 
Architecture 
 
Notice that with the exception of the interface layer, 
the components and their respective communication 
technology are not fixed. They are only provided as 
reference components. As only the interfaces are deter-
mined, existing security products can be integrated. In 
the following we show how the security product Tivoli 
Access Manager, presented in the next Section, can be 
used to provide the required functionality. 
 
3.2 Overview of the Tivoli Access Manager 
 
The Tivoli Access Manager (TAM) is a universal 
authentication and authorization framework used in 
several security products. 
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Figure 3. Architecture of the Tivoli Access Manager 
 
The overall architecture of the authorization service 
provided by the TAM, shown in Figure 3, consists of a 
Policy Management Server, a Master Policy Database 
and one or more Authorization Servers. The Policy 
Management Server manages users, groups, policies 
and protected resources. The resources are defined for 
a security domain and are stored in the Master Policy 
Database. Distributed copies of the Database are used 
by the Authorization Servers which are deployed for 
localized access control decisions. Interfaces can be 
used by policy enforcement points to request an access 
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control decision from the servers. A more extensive 
overview of the TAM framework is given in [13]. 
 
3.3 Approach to Integration 
 
Integration of the Tivoli Access Manager (TAM) 
into our security architecture requires a mapping of 
interfaces as well as data formats. The adapter pattern 
is an appropriate approach to perform this task [14], 
i.e. an additional component, converting the invocation 
of the service operations into the equivalent methods 
of the interface of the TAM, must be implemented in 
order to leave existing clients of the security services 
unchanged. This can lead to typical integration prob-
lems depending on the chosen service interface and the 
security product. Enterprise application integration 
(EAI) and other current software engineering ap-
proaches provide best practice advises for solving such 
an integration task. 
Accessing the security products’ authorization func-
tionality is a typical problem. Two extreme cases of 
interface provisioning can be distinguished. Firstly, the 
security product could offer no explicit interface at all, 
in which case a change of the security product might 
be advisable. Secondly, the security product offers 
standardized and well documented interfaces, which 
simplifies the integration. Assuming a security product 
offers an interface, the next problem is to map the 
policy data formats. Service level security data pro-
vided via the service interface might be represented by 
multiple data structures, it might not map at all on the 
product side and vice versa. If possible one of the two 
data formats can be changed to match the other one. 
Otherwise a mapping must be developed which allows 
the transformation of the greatest possible subset of the 
data. 
If the TAM is to be integrated into the security ar-
chitecture the approach is less problematic. The simpli-
fied authorization verification service interface of our 
security architecture provides a single authorize-opera-
tion, which receives an authorization request message 
and returns an access control decision in form of a 
Boolean value. The request message contains the u-
nique identifier of the requested resource, a session 
token issued to the user on authentication, as well as 
other security related data. In case of the TAM this 
represents the minimal information necessary to per-
form an access control decision. The TAM provides a-
mongst others an object-oriented authorization inter-
face consisting of several classes. Therefore the task of 
the adapter component is to map the invocation of the 
coarse-grained service operation to a sequence of fine-
grained object operations. In order to use the interface 
the adapter component must be registered in the TAM 
using provided configuration tools. Furthermore, the 
session token of the user needs to be issued by the 
same TAM instance so that the resource identifier is 
known to the TAM. Using these pieces of information 
the relevant objects of the TAM interface can be cre-
ated and the access control decision be requested from 
the Authorization Server. Additional parameters can be 
sent too, using attribute objects as containers for name-
value pairs. 
With this an integration of the security product can 
be performed at the software level. Further integration 
is needed for the different access control models to 
align the access control policies at service and product 
levels. 
 
4. Access Control Model Integration 
 
Integration of a security product into a service-
oriented security architecture leads to the necessity of 
managing different access control models. This is due 
to the different granularity and languages of service 
level and product level policies. This task of inte-
gration can be subdivided into two subtasks. Firstly, 
the access control models at both levels need to be ana-
lyzed. Secondly, rules can be defined which map poli-
cies defined at the service level to policies at the pro-
duct level. Manual adaptation is an error-prone process 
which is not feasible because of the resulting security 
issues. Therefore the policy mapping should be auto-
mated. 
In this Section we present an approach for inte-
grating different access control models. In the fol-
lowing we firstly give an overview of an extended ver-
sion of the Web Service Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (WSACML). Afterwards we describe the pro-
duct level access control model of the Tivoli Access 
Manager (TAM). Finally we define rules to map WS-
ACML polices to TAM policies. 
 
4.1 Service Level Access Control 
 
In [12] we presented a conceptual access control 
model based on attribute based access control (ABAC, 
[10]). Based on this, we developing the Web Service 
Access Control Markup Language (WSACML) to 
express attribute based access control policies at the 
service level [11]. The conceptual model of WSACML 
contains policy elements which are attached to objects. 
These policies contain one or more rules which deter-
mine the conditions necessary for permitting access to 
the object. These rules use attributes of the accessing 
subject (e.g., the identifier, the credential and the ses-
sion token), the object (e.g., possible input parameter 
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to a service operation) as well as attributes determined 
by the context of the access request. The object hierar-
chy is specialized using Web service collections, i.e. a 
set of unrelated Web services, and Web service com-
positions, i.e. a set of Web services used in a business 
process, allowing the attachment of one policy to 
multiple Web services. 
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Figure 4. Web Services Access Control Markup 
Language (WSACML) 
 
4.2 Product Level Access Control  
 
The access control model of the TAM, presented in 
Figure 5, consists of policy elements and a hierarchical 
arrangement of so called protected resources (PO). The 
latter represents the objects a user can access.  
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Figure 5. Authorization Metamodel for 
Tivoli Access Manager 
 
All protected resources belonging to a particular or-
ganization unit are placed in a secure domain, which 
itself is partitioned into objectspaces. An objectspace is 
managed and secured by a policy enforcement point 
(PEP) and contains PO of the same type, e.g., Web 
based resources, services, message queues, file sys-
tems, printer etc. The PO can further be ordered by hi-
erarchically arranging them using container objects. 
The PO can be explicitly secured by attaching policy 
elements to them or implicitly by attaching it to a con-
tainer object. 
TAM policies can be defined using access control 
lists (ACL), policies for protected objects (POP) and 
authorization rules. ACLs can be used for identity or 
role based policies. POP and authorization rules pro-
vide the possibility of defining policies related to the 
PO. Our main interest lies with the authorization rule 
policy element, which enable ABAC policies. The 
rules are based on an access decision information 
(ADI) document and are specified using the trans-
formation language Extensible Stylesheet Language 
(XSL) [15]. 
 
4.3 Mapping Rules 
 
After analyzing the Web Service Access Control 
Markup Language (WSACML) and the Tivoli Access 
Manager (TAM) policy model, mapping rules between 
WSACML policies and TAM policies can be defined. 
A WSACML policy is attached to at most one object, 
which itself can be a container for other objects. E.g., a 
Web service collection is a container for a set of Web 
services and a Web service represents a collection of 
Web service operations. Such collections are mapped 
to TAM container objects. The objects in the collection 
are mapped to protected objects. All container and re-
source objects are placed in a predefined objectspace 
managed by a specialized policy enforcement point 
(PEP) for Web services, such as a secure service agent 
[16]. 
As WSACML policies are based on attribute based 
access control (ABAC), we make extensive use of the 
TAM authorization rule policy element. A WSACML 
policy can be represented by a single authorization rule 
using a XSL-choose construct. Inside this construct, 
the WSACML rules are mapped to XSL-when con-
structs. Using the assertion and assertion function ele-
ments of the WSACML policy a Boolean expression 
for the test attribute can be defined. The effect of a 
WSACML rule is mapped to the predefined return val-
ues of the TAM rule. The relevant data to be used by 
the TAM rule evaluation engine is provided by various 
data sources. Subject attributes can be retrieved auto-
matically using the credential information of the re-
questing subject. Object attributes can be retrieved by 
an external provider using the TAM plug-in mechan-
ism or alternatively by the PEP. The latter is used in 
the case of input parameters to a Web service oper-
ation. The same applies to environment attributes. The 
main problem is to determine the format of the ADI 
document used to evaluate the authorization rules. 
Using the above attributes types, a standard format can 
be chosen which provides the relevant data inside 
corresponding XML elements. E.g., the /subjectAttrib-
ute/role expression refers to the role-element inside the 
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subjectAttribute-element. A tool to automate and sup-
port the mapping of service level to product level poli-
cies can be implemented on the basis of such a fixed 
set of mapping rules and the predefined format of the 
ADI document. 
 
5. Case Study 
 
We applied our approach to secure Web services 
used by a Web application. The application allows stu-
dents to inspect their current academic record, a sce-
nario typically found in the university domain. We 
used Web Service Access Control Markup Language 
(WSACML) policies to secure the access to the Web 
services by defining a service level policy with two 
rules. The first rule allows a user in the student role to 
review his/her and only his/her academic record. In 
this case the rule states that the unique identification 
number (UID) of the student must match the UID of 
the requested academic record and the requestor must 
be in the student role. A second rule allows a user in 
the counselor role to review all the academic records. 
In this case only the role membership is checked. 
To secure the application we implemented an adapt-
er for the Tivoli Access Manager (TAM) to encap-
sulate the transformation logic and to provide unified 
access as described earlier. For that we used stateless 
session bean components of the Enterprise JavaBeans 
(EJB) [17] component technology. The adapter com-
ponent skeleton was created in a contract-first ap-
proach given the security service interface description 
provided in [12]. The Java classes provided by the 
TAM were used for accessing the authorization frame-
work. The classes can be used either used directly or as 
an authorization provider in the authorization mechan-
ism of the Java platform. The former approach turned 
out to be more usable in our case. 
We further mapped the Web services and the WS-
ACML policy for the application to equivalent TAM 
protected resources and authorization rules by applying 
the rules defined earlier. The resulting TAM rule con-
sisted of two when-constructs, each representing an 
equivalent Boolean expression to the WSACML rules. 
These protected resources where stored in a container 
object inside a preconfigured objectspace. The policy 
rules were then linked to the container object. 
To minimize possible errors introduced by manual 
mapping, we implemented a tool using Extensible 
Stylesheet Language (XSL) for our XML notation of 
WSACML. The tool produces an XML document de-
scribing the protected objects and the authorization 
rules in a format used by the policy import tool of the 
TAM. The import tool takes care of automatically con-
figuring the resources and policies. Defining the ob-
jectspace for Web service resources remains the only 
manual task. 
 
6. Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this paper we presented an approach for trans-
parent integration of existing security products into a 
service-oriented security architecture in order to use 
existing technology to secure a modern service-ori-
ented IT infrastructure. The integration steps include 
software integration using adaptation as well as policy 
integration by mapping service level to product level 
policies. We showcased our approach by integrating 
the security product IBM Tivoli Access Manager into 
our security architecture and by mapping service level 
to technical product level access control policies. 
We see two directions for further research. Firstly 
we aim to evolve our security architecture into a more 
distributed and decentralized one. Thereby increasing 
reliability as well as enhancing solutions to issues con-
cerning privacy and distributed security information. 
Secondly, we are interested in bridging the gap be-
tween policies defined in the analysis phase and at the 
implementation phase of a software development proc-
ess by applying the presented approach of automatic 
mapping of policies to the business level. 
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